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Such a determined government attack on "customary law and cultural practice" more than two centuries after the British settlement of Australia prompts us to consider how such traces of Indigenous authority and even assertions of jurisdiction have survived. For it will be argued here that far from being resolved in 1836, the difference in customs, norms and perspectives, difference that is from those holding among the ascendant settler populations. The persistence of that difference helps to explain why more than two centuries after British settlement, Australian governments might still be seeking to terminate recognition of "customary law or cultural practice" in determination of criminal guilt. It will be suggested that the persistence of
Aboriginal difference in criminal law was an effect not only of contradictions and shortcomings in criminal justice procedure but also of the competing demands and interests of the various domains of governance (religious, through missions and administrative, through reserves, policing powers, status distinctions and population controls) in which Indigenous peoples were rendered as objects of potential transformation into self-governing citizens. These were domains of governance before or beyond which criminal jurisdiction was another threshold. While Indigenous peoples shared this subjection with some other status groups in the increasingly saturated government of populations (juveniles, for example, or mentally ill people), they brought to this arrangement something else altogether -a different linguistic, cultural and ethical universe, with its attendant structures of law and mentality, constituting worlds of difference from the settler populations. While the integrity and autonomy of those Indigenous cultures was challenged, in very many cases shattered, the historical displacement was uneven. That uneven displacement is expressed in the evidence reviewed here of the way in which Indigenous practices, beliefs and norms challenged the certitudes of criminal jurisdiction.
After considering briefly the significance of the assertion of sovereign command and later extension of jurisdiction over Aborigines in early NSW, I examine some of the ways in which criminal jurisdiction was constrained in its encounter with Indigenous peoples, both by the illegibility of their practices and perspectives and by Laws, and strongly militating against the Civilization of the Natives". The practice he objected to was the periodic assembly of Aborigines in Sydney for ritualistic punishments through spearing and fighting. 8 Unlike the military operation and threats of retaliatory violence in the first part of his Proclamation, Macquarie's proscription of these rituals was quasi-legislative, resting on the assumption that Aborigines were already (before the fact had been decided) subject to the jurisdiction of the courts for behaviours which were formally inter se in character. By the Proclamation "Any Armed Body of Natives" assembling for these purposes would be "considered as
Disturbers of the Public Peace and shall be apprehended and punished in a summary
Manner accordingly".
At the same time, we cannot read this edict as oriented only to Aborigines already within the bounds of settlement. Attached to it was a much broader objective:
"The Black natives are therefore hereby enjoined and commanded to discontinue this barbarous custom not at or near the British Settlements, but also in their own wild and of an oath, the provision of interpreters, the compellability of "wives" as witnesses, the meaning of a jury of one's peers, the availability of a jury, the status of a plea of guilty, the "tariff" of punishment. Running through policy discussion, in judicial opinion, in the public media and in government offices would run another theme, the risk of double jeopardy for offenders who might be subject to Indigenous punishments (the product of some other kind of jurisdiction) as well as that meted out in settler courts.
In the developing Australian (and other settler) polities criminal jurisdiction constituted from the mid-nineteenth century only one point in an increasingly complex field of social governance. From the founding of Governor Macquarie's Native Institution through the missionary endeavours of the mid and later nineteenth century to the formal establishment of protection regimes in a number of jurisdictions in the early twentieth century, the lives of Indigenous peoples were increasingly organised by systems of religious transformation, tutelage and welfarism. As we will see below, the determination that certain behaviours constituted a criminal offence that should be managed within the systems of policing and prosecution and punishment of the settler majority was a contingent matter. The debates around jurisdiction over Aboriginal "crime" form part of a much deeper discourse around the conditions under which Indigenous peoples would be accommodated in settler societies. When Aborigines committed crime, government responded sometimes with a decision that a person was an offender, at other times with a decision that the behaviour indicated a moral, educational, or psychological deficit that might be better met through a non-criminal justice response. Uneven and ill at ease as they may be, the discourses framing such decisions spoke of the tribal or native or "customary" character of Indigenous practices, from the beginning of settlement and persistently as
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II
Detailed attention to prosecutions of Aboriginal offenders for inter se as well as inter-racial offences in the middle years of the colonial period has shown how insecure were the claims of settler jurisdiction. 13 In late colonial Queensland (separated from New South Wales in 1859), a place widely reputed to be among the worst examples of Aboriginal repression 14 , the reality of law in everyday life exhibited the continuing undercurrent of Indigenous jurisdiction. Amenability to jurisdiction brought many Indigenous inter se homicides to the Queensland courts from the 1860s. 15 As they struggled to deal with the realities of Aboriginal difference, police, prosecutors, courts and the executive council (responsible for clemency decisions in capital cases) were faced repeatedly with evidence that referred to experience and belief systems beyond their understanding.
Before the Supreme Court sitting in the northern city of Charters Towers in 1886 Aborigines Paddy and Wills were charged with murder of another man, Billy.
The defendants and victim were described as "Aboriginal natives of Queensland".
Billy was out of his country, having been recruited for employment on a pastoral station some 500 miles from his home. In Indigenous space, Billy was likely in places where he was not welcome, since Paddy at least was from a local people. There was counsel for defence but no interpreter; the judge later expressed some doubt about the defendants' ability to understand the trial adequately. Defence argued that the prisoners were ignorant of the laws of the country, an argument that built on evidence from the white station owner that indicated there was a "tribal" element in
Finnane: Limits of jurisdiction 11 the killing: "generally if two blacks belonging to different tribes meet and one gets an opportunity to kill the other he will do it". There was little other evidence of motive but some confessional evidence making the case more one of manslaughter. The judge told the jury "that the Prisoners' ignorance of the law, a preference for their own tribal observances was no excuse for or justification of the crime if they were satisfied of its commission, though it might be a subject of consideration by the Executive in the event of a conviction". In delivering their verdict after long deliberation the jury found both men guilty "& strongly recommended them to mercy on the grounds of ignorance of the laws of the country". 16 This muted recognition of "tribal observances" thus effected a result that found its justification not in a discovery of motive but in a postulation of the defendants' ignorance of settler law. with "a strong recommendation to mercy owing to delusion through prisoner's tribal beliefs". While the rider had no legal force it was the kind of thing calculated to weigh in an executive consideration of clemency. 17 As the police inspector first reported the case, drawing on the amateur ethnography that commonly characterised police practice: "I have known for years past that Aboriginals have a strange superstition in respect to the giving of a bone, and a great many of them believe that there are certain aboriginals who have the power to kill them with a bone which has been taken from the dead body of an aboriginal…". 18 The standing of such accounts of sorcery, like allusions to any kind of Indigenous beliefs and practices was unstable in the policing and court systems -capable of attracting notice, rarely provoking detailed inquiry for the purpose of establishing criminal responsibility or mitigating guilt and amenability to the penal tariff at this time of capital punishment, but having the potential to sway juries, judges, and executive council that they were dealing with other, impenetrable, worlds that needed to be judged somehow differently to the usual run of defendants. What is less well known is the infra-legal structure of authority in the reserves and missions administered under the regime of a Chief Protector. These were places in which the quotidian routines of policing and law court were set aside for the sake of transforming Aboriginal subjects into the governable and rights-bearing subjects of Australian law, at some point in the indefinite future. The scope of these regimes in objective and method may be learned from the diaries of the missionary Rev William
Mackenzie of Aurukun, a mission on the western side of the Cape York Peninsula "ruled" by Mackenzie for some four decades from 1925. Mackenzie ruled his subjects with an iron fist, sometimes literally, but always with the object of effecting the transformation of individuals and community into the God-fearing citizenry that might one day emerge from his transformative regime, were they to survive its excesses. Thus evidence of abortion was not prosecuted, but made the subject of there is no doubt that it would be impossible to secure a jury in the Territory which would convict a white man of the murder of a native solely on aboriginal evidence, no matter however strong; while there would be comparatively little difficulty in securing the conviction of a native for killing a white man on much more slender evidence. In this the Judge concurs. 22 The management of justice in small communities in which juries might be suborned we were to take further action by a committal, then it could be argued that we did not agree with the processes of law and had, in fact, pre-judged the defendant'. and another, Jack Wheeler, found guilty of manslaughter. In sentencing remarks, Kriewaldt J was brief but incisive.
I cannot allow myself to be influenced in this case by the failure of the authorities to bring well merited prosecutions in respect of the other non-fatal spearings. I have also come to the conclusion that since the criminal law is one of the means which must be used as an aid in the process of the assimilation of the Australian aboriginal into an integrated community, the sentence must give the aborigines at Papunyah notice that spearing will not be tolerated.
In coming to his conclusion that a sentence of 16 months for manslaughter was appropriate in this case Kriewaldt balanced two considerations -one that the death was indeed accidental, since "in the majority of cases where aboriginals spear each other, death does not follow"; the other that although the defendant had little contact with "white civilization" he was then living in a government settlement and "obviously the custom of "pay back" cannot be permitted to continue on settlements staffed by Government officials". 34 Kriewaldt's reasoning highlighted the unease still prevailing in exercise of criminal jurisdiction in this Australian territory. In a direction to the jury in the related prosecution of Timmy Kriewaldt had already alluded to that unease, centred on the question of whether an "Aboriginal native" should be tried in the same court and by same rules as "a white person". As he commented, "[p]eople have argued for 150 years or more whether this is a good thing. Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not." 
